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This paper begins with a simple proof of the existence of squash operators compatible with the
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol which suits single-mode as well as multi-mode threshold
detectors. The proof shows that, when a given detector is symmetric under cyclic group C4, and
a certain observable associated with it has rank two as a matrix, then there always exists a corre-
sponding squash operator. Next, we go on to investigate whether the above restriction of ‘rank two’
can be eliminated; i.e., is cyclic symmetry alone sufficient to guarantee the existence of a squash
operator? The motivation behind this question is that, if this were true, it would imply that one
could realize a device-independent and unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocol.
However, the answer turns out to be negative, and moreover, one can instead prove a no-go theorem
that any symmetry is, by itself, insufficient to guarantee the existence of a squash operator.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique for
distributing information-theoretically-secure secret keys
between two parties connected by a quantum channel.
The oldest and now defacto standard protocol for QKD
is the well-known Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) proto-
col [1]. Several different approaches are known today
for proving its unconditional security [2, 3, 4, 5]; e.g.
one based on virtual entanglement distillation protocol
(EDP) [2, 3] and another based on the complementarity
of quantum theory [4].
The most widely used of these approaches is the one
based on EDP, where an actual QKD protocol is con-
verted to an equivalent and virtual EDP performed by
Alice and Bob. The conversions must be made so that
Alice’s and Bob’s quantum operations are seen by Eve
to remain the same positive operator valued measures
(POVM); i.e., Eve’s information regarding the secret key
bits is not changed by conversion. In the original versions
of EDP-based proofs [2, 3], one needed to assume that
the actual protocol had access to a perfect single-photon
source and photon-number resolving detectors. However,
this assumption is invalid for real-world QKD systems,
which use attenuated lasers as light sources, and the re-
ceiver uses ‘threshold detectors,’ which can discriminate
a nonzero photon state from the vacuum, but cannot de-
termine the exact photon number.
In fact, techniques are already known that can fill
these gaps. As for light sources, by exploiting decoy
states, lasers can be driven to effectively emit single-
photon pulses [6]. One of the known solutions for de-
tectors [7, 8, 10] is the powerful theoretical tool called
‘squash operator’. Squash operator is a quantum opera-
tion which transforms an incoming n-photon state to a
qubit state. By incorporating this operator into a con-
ventional type of security proof where Bob has a photon-
number discriminating detector, one automatically ob-
tains a new proof that remains valid even if threshold
detectors are used. A squash operator was first assumed
in the security proof by Gottesman et al. [3], however, its
existence was only conjectured, no proof was given. For
threshold detectors, which are sensitive only to single-
mode photon pulses, its existence was proved first by the
present author and Tamaki [7], and also independently
by Beaudry et al. [8].
The aim of this paper is to investigate how far we can
generalize this result from the viewpoint of symmetry
constraints imposed on the detector. In the first half
of this paper, we show that when a given set of POVM
is symmetric under transformations of cyclic group C4,
and the observableMz related with it has rank two, then
there always exists a corresponding squash operator com-
patible with the BB84 protocol (Theorem 1). An imme-
diate corollary of this theorem is that a squash operator
exists, not only for single-mode threshold detectors, but
also for multi-mode threshold detectors. Next, in the sec-
ond half of the paper, we tackle the question of whether
the above restriction of ‘rank two’ can be eliminated. The
answer, however, turns out to be negative. Furthermore,
it can be shown that, more generally, no symmetry is
sufficient by itself to guarantee the existence of a squash
operator (Theorem 2).
Definition of Squash Operator. — In the BB84 proto-
col, Alice and Bob use two different bases, r, for their
measurements, interchangeably. They are usually de-
noted as the z and the x basis (r = z, x) because they
are related to qubit measurements of the Pauli matrices
σz, σx. Similarly, the notation of r = +,× bases is used
to indicate the directions of photon polarization. In what
follows, we stick to the notation of r = z, x for the sake
of simplicity.
We denote the Hilbert space of the receiver’s incoming
states as HB. In this space, there are two sets of POVM
elements, M(r,b), corresponding to basis r = z, x and the
output bit b = 0, 1. We also define observables Mr :=
M(r,0) −M(r,1) for later convenience. For example, if a
receiver measures state ρB ∈ HB using the x basis, he
observes output bit b = 0 with the probability p(x,0) =
Tr
(
ρBM(x,0)
)
. We also assume that the measurements
are complete for each basis; that is,
M(r,0) +M(r,1) = IB (1)
holds for r = z, x, where IB is the identity operator of
HB.
2Squash operator F is a completely positive trace-
preserving (CPTP) map with the following properties
[14]. F maps states in HB to those in qubit space HC ,
and, when F is followed by the z or the x measurement
in HC , it reproduces Mr of the actual measurement de-
vice. That is, for an arbitrary mixed state ρB ∈ HB, it
satisfies
Tr (F (ρB)σr) = Tr (ρBMr) for r = z, x (2)
with σr being the Pauli operators. A convenient way of
describing F is to use an operator sum representation
with a set of Kraus operators Fc (see, e.g., [12].) In this
notation, the trace-preserving condition of F takes the
form
∑
c F
†
c Fc = IB . Complete positiveness is guaran-
teed as long as F is expressed as F (ρB) =
∑
c FcρBF
†
c .
This notation has the additional merit that the Hermi-
tian conjugate, F †, of F can be expressed in simple form
as F †(ρC) =
∑
F †c ρCFc with ρc being an arbitrary state
in HC . By using these relations, the definition of squash
operator F forMr given in (2) can be equivalently stated
as the following two conditions for Kraus operator Fc,
Mr =
∑
c
F †c σrFc, (3)
IB =
∑
c
F †c Fc. (4)
Cyclically Symmetric POVM for the BB84 protocol. —
In the first half of this paper, we show that F actually ex-
ists for multi-mode threshold detectors as well. Against
this goal, we generalize the problem slightly by taking up
finite group C4, i.e., a cyclic group of order 4, and con-
sider POVM elements M(r,b) which are symmetric under
its transformations (for details of C4 group, see, e.g., [9].)
The C4-symmetry ofM(r,b) is stated rigorously as follows.
Definition 1 A set of POVM elements {M(r,b)} of BB84
type is C4-symmetric, if there exists unitary operator U
satisfying U4k = IB with k ∈ N, and it transforms them
as follows
UM(z,b)U
† = M(x,b), (5)
U2M(r,b)U
†2 = M(r,1−b). (6)
Intuitively, operator U corresponds to rotating a detector
spatially by 45 degrees, when polarization encoding is
used. It can be better seen if we newly define operators
L0, . . . , L3 as L2b = M(z,b) and L2b+1 = M(x,b) for b =
0, 1. The relations (5) and (6) can thus be rewritten
as ULcU
† = Lc+1, where modulo 4 is assumed in the
summation of index c. Note here that, with U being a
45-degree rotation, we have U8 = IB instead of U
4 = IB.
This example demonstrates why we needed to consider
cases of k > 1 in Definition 1.
Theorem 1 If a given set of POVM elements {M(r,b)}
of BB84 type is C4-symmetric, and the rank of the corre-
sponding observableMz (or equivalently, Mx) as a matrix
is two, there always exists a corresponding squash opera-
tor compatible with the BB84 protocol.
Here, it should be noted that the restriction of ‘rank two’
does not necessarily mean that the Hilbert space HB is
a qubit space, as illustrated by the following example.
An important example of C4-symmetric POVMs is the
threshold detector. In this paragraph, following [7, 8],
we concentrate on photon detection modules consisting
of two photon threshold detectors, each of which corre-
sponds to output bits b = 0, 1; we call such photon detec-
tion units simply ‘threshold detectors’ with a slight abuse
of the terminology. We also assume that, when both de-
tectors click coincidently (double-click events), the de-
tection system outputs a random bit as its output, b.
However, we differ from [7, 8] in that we do not restrict
ourselves to a single mode, but assume that an incoming
light pulse may have m ≥ 1 modes of propagation; we la-
bel each of them by index i. We also denote the number
of photons in mode i as ni, and let N = (n1, n2, . . . , nm).
Clearly, any threshold detector is block diagonalized with
respect to the photon number configurationN , and there
is no loss of generality in considering each of the blocks
individually when analyzing security. For each such sec-
tion, N , the observables Mr can be written as a matrix
with rank two
Mr = |N ; r, 0〉〈N ; r, 0| − |N ; r, 1〉〈N ; r, 1| (7)
for r ∈ {z, x}, where
|N ; r, b〉 := AN (a†1rb)n1(a†2rb)n2 · · · (a†mrb)nm |0〉. (8)
Note here that Mr has rank two because double-click
events are replaced by a random bit in our model, and
thus all states besides |N ; r, 0〉 and |N ; r, 1〉 are can-
celled in the subtraction Mr = M(r,0) −M(r,1) (a sim-
ilar argument can be found in [10].) Coefficient AN
in (8) is the normalization constant for state |N ; r, b〉,
and a†irb are the creation operators for photons propa-
gating in mode i, having bit value b of basis r. In ac-
cordance with the usual notations of Pauli matrices, cre-
ation operators a†irb for two bases r = z, x are related as
a†ixb =
1√
2
(
a†iz0 + (−1)ba†iz1
)
. The single-mode thresh-
old detectors discussed in [7, 8] correspond to the special
case of m = 1. C4-symmetry can be shown by using an
explicit form of the transforming operator UN ,
UN = exp
[
i
2
∑
i
(
a†iy0aiy0 − a†iy1aiy1
)]
.
The creation operator along the y-axis appearing in
the above equation is defined as a†iyb = (a
†
iz0 +
i(−1)ba†iz1)/
√
2.
From these facts, and also from Theorem 1, it immedi-
ately follows that a squash operator exists, not only for
single-mode threshold detectors, but also for multi-mode
threshold detectors.
3Proof of Theorem 1. Here we give only the proof
for k = 1, since all other cases (k ≥ 2) can be shown
by exactly the same argument. As can be seen from
U2MzU
†2 = −Mz, for each normalized eigenstate |v〉 of
Mz with an eigenvalue 0 < λ ≤ 1, there always exists an-
other eigenstate U2|v〉 having a different eigenvalue −λ,
and thus is orthogonal
〈v|U2|v〉 = 0. (9)
From this, and since the rank ofMz is two, it follows that
Mz takes the form
Mz = λ
(|v〉〈v| − U2|v〉〈v|U †2) . (10)
By using a basis that diagonalizes U , we can always de-
compose |v〉 as
|v〉 =
3∑
c=0
µc |vc〉 , (11)
with U |vc〉 = ic |vc〉. Then, from (9), we see that coeffi-
cients µi satisfy
|µ0|2 + |µ2|2 = |µ1|2 + |µ3|2 = 1
2
. (12)
We now define a completely positive, but not necessar-
ily trace-preserving map, F , with a set of Kraus operators
F0, F1, . . . , F3 which take the form
Fc =
√
2λ (µc+1|0y〉〈vc|+ µc|1y〉〈vc+1|) (13)
if µcµ
∗
c+1 6= 0, otherwise Fc = 0. In (13), modulo 4
is assumed for the summations of index c. From the
linearity of F †, we obtain the following relation
F †(σz + iσx) =
3∑
c=0
F †c (σz + iσx)Fc
= 2
3∑
c=0
F †c |0y〉〈1y|Fc = 4λ
3∑
c=0
µcµ
∗
c+1 |vc〉 〈vc+1|
= λ
3∑
c=0
icU c|v〉〈v|U †c =Mz + iMx. (14)
Similarly, from eqs. (12) and (13), we have F †(IC) =∑3
c=0 F
†
c Fc ≤ IB . Furthermore, F can be modified such
that it satisfies the trace-preserving condition (6), and
also maintains relation F †(σz + iσx) = Mz + iMx, ob-
tained in (14). This can be done by introducing extra
Kraus operators Fc, c > 3, having the form Fc = |by〉〈ψc|
with b = 0 or 1.
That the CPTP map F thus obtained also sat-
isfies (5) for r = z can be shown as F †(σz) =
1
2F
† ((σz + iσx) + H.c.) = 12 (Mz + iMx) + H.c. = Mz,
where ‘H.c.’ denotes the Hermitian conjugate. The other
relation for r = x can be shown similarly. (End of proof.)
Does Symmetry Imply the Existence of Squash Oper-
ators? — A natural question that arises here is: Can
we eliminate the restriction of ‘rank two’ appearing in
Theorem 1? In other words, is cyclic symmetry C4 alone
sufficient to guarantee the existence of a squash operator?
Or more generally, is there any types of symmetry that
is strong enough to ensure its existence? In the remain-
ing half of this paper, we shall investigate this possibility.
This question is interesting because if this were actually
the case, we would need no knowledge about microscopic
structures of a detector in order to ensure the existence
of its squash operator. In other words, we would succeed
in proving the unconditional security of QKD in a device-
independent way (for security against collective attacks,
see [13]).
Indeed, C4-symmetry is already realized in most con-
ventional BB84 systems (c.f. the paragraph below Def-
inition 1). For example, when polarization encoding is
used, bases z, x can be switched by rotating the detector
by 45 degrees. In addition, the receiver may interchange
the assignment of two detectors to output bit b = 0, 1
randomly, by rotating them by 90 degrees and flipping b.
This may be done, in order to cancel the mismatch be-
tween two detectors in terms of quantum bit error rate.
These two types of rotation generate a C4 group.
Moreover, for some QKD protocols, no knowledge
about microscopic structures of any components besides
detectors are needed to prove security. For example, con-
sider the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 protocol [11],
where an untrusted third party prepares an entangled
state. It is clear that if symmetry could actually im-
ply the existence of squash operators, we would be able
to prove the security of a QKD system without knowing
anything of the microscopic structure of the devices, only
the macroscopic operations by Alice and Bob.
However, as we shall show below, that is not actually
the case. The fact is that we can prove a no-go theorem
that denies all such possibilities. In order to discuss this
point rigorously, we define general symmetries of POVM
below, and then present a theorem.
Definition 2 A set of POVM elements {M(r,b)} of BB84
type is symmetric under finite group G, if they transform
under G as
V (g)M(r,b)V
†(g) =Mg(r,b) for g ∈ G,
with V (g) being a unitary representation of group G.
Here, map g : (r, b) 7→ (r′, b′) determines how each
POVM element M(r,b) is transformed into another ele-
ment by g ∈ G.
Theorem 2 No symmetry is sufficient by itself to guar-
antee the existence of a squash operator. That is, one
cannot prove a theorem that states that ‘For an arbitrary
G-symmetric set of POVM, there always exists a squash
operator compatible with the BB84 protocol.’
We present below a proof of this theorem. The basic
strategy here is to show that, if the type of theorems
as quoted in Theorem 2 holds, it can be used to show
4the improbable proposition that any arbitrary operator,
whether symmetric or asymmetric, possesses a squash
operator.
Proof of Theorem 2. For an arbitrary set of operators
M(r,b) of BB84 type, which may not be symmetric, one
can always define other G-symmetric operators M˜(r,b) as
M˜(r,b) :=
∑
g∈G
Mg−1(r,b) ⊗ |g〉〈g|
in HB ⊗ HD. Here, HD is an ancilla space which is
spanned by orthonormal basis {|g〉}g∈G, that is, a set of
orthonormal states |g〉 labeled by all elements g ∈ G. M˜
is G-symmetric under unitary transformation V˜ as de-
fined by V˜ (g) := idB ⊗RD(g) with RD being the regular
representation of G defined by RD(g)|h〉D = |gh〉D (see,
e.g., [9]). Hence if one could prove the type of theorems
quoted in Theorem 2, it would readily follow that there
is a squash operator for M˜(r,b).
On the contrary, however, once such a F˜ is obtained,
one can also construct squash operator F for the original
operators M(r,b). In order to see this, note that we have
for an arbitrary ρB ∈ HB
Tr [MrρB] = Tr
[
M˜r (ρB ⊗ |e〉〈e|)
]
= Tr
[
σrF˜ (ρB ⊗ |e〉〈e|)
]
.
with e being the identity element of G. Thus, applying
F˜ on ρB ⊗ |e〉〈e| serves as a correct squash operator for
ρB. This result shows that any POVM M(r,b) of BB84
type, whether symmetric or not, possesses a squash op-
erator. However, this leads to a contradiction because
there exists the counterexample of POVMM0 defined by
M0z =M0x = σz
which has no squash operator.
The fact thatM0 does not possess any squash operator
can be shown, e.g, by the same argument as Beaudry, Mo-
roder, and Lu¨tkenhaus used for the six-state protocol [8],
but it can alternatively be shown by the following simple
argument. Consider the situation where Alice and Bob
perform the BBM92 protocol using M0 as their detec-
tors, and, as the entanglement source, Eve provides states
|ψb〉 := |bz〉A ⊗ |bz〉B with a bit b ∈ {0, 1} of her choice.
In this setup, clearly, all sifted key bits b are known to
Eve, and thus Alice and Bob will never succeed in shar-
ing secret keys. Hence, the existence of squash operator
F for M0 would lead to a contradiction, since F could be
used to prove the unconditional security of this system,
with the quantum bit error rate measured by Alice and
Bob being exactly zero. (End of proof.)
Summary. — In this paper, we first showed that, if
a given detector is C4-symmetric, and the observable
Mz associated with it has rank two, then there always
exists a corresponding squash operator compatible with
the BB84 protocol (Theorem 1). By using this result,
we then proved that squash operators exist, not only for
single-mode threshold detectors, but also for multi-mode
threshold detectors.
Next, we took up the question of whether this result
can be generalized to symmetric detectors with arbitrary
ranks, as an attempt toward the realization of device-
independent and unconditionally secure QKD protocols.
However, it turned out that the fact is quite opposite.
That is, we have succeed in proving that, no matter what
symmetry one imposes on the detectors, the symmetry is
never sufficient, by itself, to guarantee the existence of a
corresponding squash operator (Theorem 2).
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